In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for image classi cation and many other learning tasks, even though they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial a acks. To increase their robustness against these a acks, there have emerged numerous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mechanisms either rely on being tuned for each type of a ack, or they do not generalize across di erent a ack types. To alleviate these issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detection, RAID, that trains a secondary classi er to identify di erences in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs. Our technique is both more reliable and more e ective than the state of the art when evaluated against six popular a acks. Moreover, a straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without a ecting its e ectiveness.
INTRODUCTION
ere is no doubt that neural networks are becoming rapidly and increasingly prevalent. eir success has been particularly impressive for the task of accurately recognizing pa erns and classifying images [57] , on which we focus here. Even though such networks are able to achieve very high accuracy for "normal" (i.e., benign) images, they may be tricked by adversaries into providing wrong classi cations. More speci cally, given a correctly classi ed image, an adversary may perturb it slightly-typically almost unnoticeably according to human perception-to generate an image that is classied di erently. Such images are referred to as adversarial [58] and pose a serious threat to emerging applications of machine learning, such as autonomous driving [18, 44] .
To protect neural networks against adversarial a acks, there have emerged numerous defense mechanisms that aim to correctly classify adversarial inputs. However, most of these defenses have not been found e ective in preventing adversarial images from being misclassi ed [9] . As a result, the research community has also focused on automated detection of adversarial images, that is, on devising mechanisms for detecting whether an input to a neural network is adversarial (see [11] for examples).
Adversarial-image detection. In the context of adversarialimage detection, some state-of-the-art detection mechanisms are classi er based, that is, they train a secondary classi er for determining whether inputs of a neural network are adversarial. A recent, notable example is SADL [29] , an approach that relies on ISSTA '20, Los Angeles, California, United States 2016. 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn the observation that "surprising" inputs are more likely to be adversarial. Depending on the surprise measure, the e ectiveness of this approach relies on tuning its hyper-parameters, namely which neurons are used to measure surprise, for each type of a ack. However, in practice, detection mechanisms are typically unaware of the types of incoming a acks.
In terms of classi er-free detection mechanisms, a novel example is mMutant [60] , which assumes adversarial images to be more "sensitive" than normal ones. More speci cally, the assumption is that the classi cation outcome for adversarial inputs is more likely to change when performing minor mutations to the neural network. However, this assumption does not generalize to adversarial inputs with a high prediction con dence, that is, inputs for which the neural network provides a wrong classi cation with high con dence.
Our approach. To alleviate these issues, we present a new adversarial-image detection technique, called RAID. Our technique is based on teaching a secondary classi er to recognize di erences in neuron activation values between adversarial and normal inputs. We show that the e ectiveness of RAID is stable with respect to its hyper-parameters across a wide range of adversarial a acks. RAID consistently outperforms SADL and mMutant on these a acks by up to 88%. Moreover, in contrast to these techniques, there exists a simple extension to RAID that increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without a ecting its e ectiveness.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present a simple, yet very e ective, adversarial-image detection technique for neural networks. (2) We extend our technique to increase its robustness against stronger adversaries that can tailor their a acks to speci c detection mechanisms. (3) We implement our approach and make the implementation publicly available. (4) We extensively evaluate our approach and compare it with three state-of-the-art detection techniques.
Outline. e next section provides background on di erent types of adversaries and a acks. Sect. 3 explains our adversarialimage detection approach. We present our experimental evaluation in Sect. 4, discuss related work in Sect. 5, and conclude in Sect. 6.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a short overview of threat models and adversarial a acks.
reat Models
A threat model describes the conditions under which a detection mechanism is designed to work. Consequently, the threat model is necessary for assessing the e ectiveness of a detector [9] .
Adversarial a acks are typically categorized according to two main threat models: (1) white-box a acks, where the adversary has perfect knowledge of the neural network including, for example, its architecture and parameters, and (2) black-box a acks, which generate adversarial examples without any internal information about the neural network. In this work, we consider the stronger white-box threat model although our technique is also applicable against black-box a acks. White-box adversaries come in two capacities, namely static and adaptive.
Static adversaries.
A static adversary is an a acker that is unaware of any detection mechanism protecting a network model against adversarial a acks. A static adversary makes use of existing white-box a acks to generate adversarial examples but does not tailor these a acks to breach any speci c detection mechanism.
Adaptive adversaries. An adaptive adversary is an a acker that is aware of the detection mechanism protecting a network model, if any. Such an adversary also has knowledge of internal parameters of the detection mechanism. As a result, it may adapt the adversarial a acks it generates to breach the particular detection mechanism that is in place. Adaptive adversaries are clearly more powerful than static ones.
In this paper, we evaluate our approach as well as three stateof-the-art adversarial-image detection techniques on several static adversaries. We also extend our approach to adaptive adversaries and reason about its e ectiveness.
Adversarial Attacks
In the context of deep learning, adversarial examples are generally de ned as inputs to a neural network that are speci cally cra ed to trick it into making a wrong prediction [9] . Practically, such examples are generated by slightly distorting correctly classi ed inputs. Since discovering the vulnerability of neural networks to adversarial examples [58] , there have emerged numerous a acks in the literature, some of which have gained signi cant traction and are routinely used as benchmarks for evaluating both other a acks as well as detection mechanisms.
In our experiments, we also use such well-known a acks to evaluate the e ectiveness of our approach against static adversaries. More speci cally, we use the following six a acks:
(1) Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [36] (2) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23] (3) Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [31] (4) DeepFool (DF) [39] (5) Carlini-Wagner (CW) [13] (6) Jacobian Saliency Map A ack (JSMA) [45] Each of these a acks speci es an upper bound on the amount of allowed distortion. is bound is typically de ned in terms of norms, such as L ∞ , L 2 , and L 0 . For example, DF is an L 2 a ack, meaning that the L 2 norm of original and adversarial inputs cannot be larger than a given bound. Regarding the above a acks, PGD, FGSM, and BIM are L ∞ a acks, DF and CW L 2 , and JSMA L 0 . e L 2 a acks are found to be stronger than the others [13] .
As we previously mentioned, these are white-box a acks of static adversaries. A acks of adaptive adversaries are speci cally tailored to the detection mechanism of the model under threat. erefore, di erent detection mechanisms require di erent a acks, which means that there is no o -the-shelf adaptive adversary.
OUR APPROACH
Correctly classi ed (or normal) and adversarial inputs might look almost identical to the human eye. However, the activation ngerprints, that is, the neuron activation values, that these two kinds of inputs leave on a neural network are certainly di erent. is is because adversarial inputs cause the neural network to make a di erent prediction, and this di erence is manifested through a change in the activation values of the neurons in the output network layer. For the activation values of these neurons to be di erent, there must also be changes in the activation values of neurons in previous layers.
As an example, we train a neural network on the MNIST [2] dataset for identifying handwri en-digit images. We then collect the activation values of four arbitrarily selected neurons for both normal and adversarial images, which are generated by the PGD a ack. On the le of Fig. 1 , we draw a box-plot of their activation values distinguishing between normal and adversarial images. As shown in the gure, there is a clear di erence in the activation values of these neurons for the two kinds of images. In this paper, we present a Randomized Adversarial-Image Detection approach, which we call RAID, leveraging exactly this di erence. Fig. 2 gives an overview of RAID. In step 1, RAID provides a set of normal inputs to the neural network under threat, and for each input, records the activation values of every neuron. It also calculates the mean activation value of every neuron for all normal inputs. In step 2, RAID repeats this process for adversarial inputs that are generated by perturbing the normal inputs of the rst step. In step 3, RAID selects a number of neurons to monitor based on the mean di erence in activation values. In step 4, RAID trains a detection classi er based on the recorded activation values of the selected neurons.
To decide whether a new input is adversarial, RAID monitors the activation values of the selected neurons during prediction to obtain the ngerprint that is fed to the trained detection classi er.
De nitions
Let N = {n 1 , n 2 , . . . } be the set of all neurons (excluding input and output layers) in a neural network NN and X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . } an arbitrary set of inputs. We denote the activation value of a neuron n i for an input x j as n i (x j ). We call n i (X ) the activation-value block of n i with respect to inputs X , which essentially denotes a vector of activation values n i (x j ) for each input x j ∈ X (neuron n i is xed).
N stands for an ordered subset of all neurons N in the neural network. N (x j ) denotes the activation ngerprint (AF) of input x j on the neurons in subset N . e activation ngerprint is de ned as a vector of activation values n i (x j ) for each neuron n i ∈ N (input x j is xed).
N (X ) yields a two-dimensional matrix, where each row corresponds to the activation ngerprint of an input x j ∈ X on neurons N and each column to the activation-value block of a neuron n i ∈ N with respect to inputs X .
We de ne a mean activation ngerprint, denoted N (X ), as a vector that replaces each activation-value block in N (X ) by its mean activation value. en, the di erence of mean activation ngerprints for two sets of inputs X and Y is de ned as -N (X ) − N (Y )-, where the subtraction is performed element-wise.
RAID
RAID, is a simple, yet very e ective, technique for detecting adversarial images. It is based on the key insight of leveraging di erences in the activation ngerprints that normal and adversarial inputs leave on the NN under threat.
To make use of this insight, RAID starts by computing N(X ) and N(X ) for all neurons in NN, where X is a set of normal inputs, and X the set of adversarial inputs generated by perturbing the inputs in X . In our experience, however, not all neurons behave di erently for normal and adversarial inputs. For instance, it could be the case that, for a particular neuron n i , the activation-value blocks n i (X ) and n i (X ) in N(X ) and N(X ), respectively, contain similar activation values.
On the right of Fig Our technique, therefore, lters out inessential neurons. More speci cally, RAID computes and sorts the vector |N(X ) − N(X )|.
en, based on a given percentage, which is a hyper-parameter of our technique called ltering threshold, RAID drops the percentage of this sorted vector with the lowest activation values.
RAID uses the activation values of the remaining essential neurons to train an adversarial-input detection classi er. In particular, our technique randomly selects a number of essential neurons to monitor, which is also a hyper-parameter of RAID. It then labels each AF of input x ∈ X on the monitored neurons as normal, and each AF of x ∈ X as adversarial. ese AFs together with their labels are used to train our detection classi er. In Sect. 4, we show how the number of monitored neurons impacts the e ectiveness of our technique. We also discuss why we randomly select the monitored neurons, instead of deterministically picking them. e detection classi er takes the AF that a new input of the neural network leaves on the monitored neurons and decides whether the input is adversarial. Due to the relatively small number of monitored neurons, the input space of the detection classi er is not high dimensional, that is, the AFs do not have too many features. As a result, this allows us to choose a simple type of classi er without compromising the e ectiveness of our approach. Instead of training a large detection neural network as in existing classi er-based work (e.g., [38] ), our experiments demonstrate the competitive e ectiveness of much simpler classi ers, such as decision trees, random forests, etc.
P-RAID: Pooled RAID
Existing classi er-based detection techniques [22, 24, 38] have been very successful in detecting adversarial examples. Despite their success, they have been criticized for being vulnerable to adaptive white-box a acks [11] . In particular, the criticism is that if a white-box a ack can trick a neural network into making a wrong prediction, then it should also be able to bypass the detection classi er by adapting its adversarial a acks. We, therefore, extend our approach to be robust against adaptive white-box a acks. We refer to our extended technique as P-RAID, for Pooled-RAID. e di erence between RAID and P-RAID consists in training a pool of detection classi ers, instead of a single one. Each classier in the pool is trained with the AFs le on an equal number of randomly selected essential neurons. ese neurons are selected uniformly from the entire NN (a er having ltered out the inessential neurons). is results in distinct classi ers, which however are trained for the same goal. We pick an equal number of neurons for each classi er so that they are all similarly e ective in detecting adversarial examples-recall that the number of monitored neurons impacts the e ectiveness of the classi ers. Now, for each new input of the neural network, P-RAID selects uniformly at random a detection classi er from the pool. e selected classi er determines if the input is adversarial. As we show in Sect. 4, extending our technique in this way does not impact its e ectiveness. On the contrary, we argue that it improves its robustness against adaptive white-box a acks. Given that P-RAID picks the detection classi er nondeterministically for each input, an adaptive a acker would have to tailor its adversarial a acks to all classi ers in the pool. is is infeasible for three main reasons. First, the size of the pool can be arbitrarily large. Second, an a ack that is optimized against one classi er might be impossible to also optimize against another since they are trained on di erent sets of neurons. ird, the pool of classi ers could contain di erent classi er types (e.g., k-nearest neighbors, random forests, etc.), which makes it even more di cult to tailor an a ack to all classi ers.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we address the following research questions using established evaluation guidelines for adversarial robustness [9, 11] : RQ1: How e ective is our approach in detecting adversarial images?
RQ2: Does our approach generalize within and across a ack norms?
RQ3: How does our approach compare with state-of-the-art detection techniques?
RQ4: How does the selection of monitored neurons impact the e ectiveness of our approach?
RQ5: How do multiple detection classi ers impact the e ectiveness of our approach?
RQ6: How e ective are di erent detection classi er types?
Implementation
We implemented (P-)RAID in Python using the popular machinelearning framework Keras [1] (v2.3.1) with the Tensor ow [3] (v1.15.0) back-end for analyzing neural networks. We also employ the scikit-learn library [47] for training detection classi ers. Last, we use IBM's Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) [41] for generating adversarial examples. Our implementation is open source.
Setup
We set up our experiments as follows.
Datasets and network models. We evaluate our technique on neural-network models trained on two popular datasets, namely MNIST [2] and CIFAR-10 [30] . MNIST is a dataset for recognizing handwri en-digit images, whereas the CIFAR-10 dataset focuses on recognizing objects and classifying them into ten categories. It is common to evaluate the e ectiveness of adversarial-image detection techniques on these two datasets (e.g., [29, 60] ). For MNIST, we trained a 5-layer convolutional neural network (ConvNet), with 320 neurons and 99.31% accuracy (when using 60,000 images for training and 10,000 for testing). For CIFAR-10, we trained a 12-layer ConvNet, with 2,208 neurons and 82.27% accuracy (when using 50,000 images for training and 10,000 for testing). ese speci c network models have also been used to evaluate a recent related technique [29] .
Adversarial images. We generate adversarial images using six well-known a acks (see Sect. 2.2). e hyper-parameter con guration of each a ack is given below:
-PGD: is is an iterative L ∞ -norm a ack. We set the maximum number of iterations to 100 and the maximum distortion to 0.3 in terms of the L ∞ norm. -FGSM: is is a one step L ∞ -norm a ack. We set the maximum distortion to 0.3 in terms of the L ∞ norm. -BIM: is a ack is the iterative version of the FGSM a ack. e maximum number of iterations is set to 100 and the maximum distortion to 0.3 in terms of the L ∞ norm.
-DF: is is an iterative L 2 -norm a ack. We set the maximum number of iterations to 100. -CW: Although there is an L ∞ -norm version of this a ack, we employ its stronger L 2 -norm version [13] . We use the default se ings of the ART library [41] . -JSMA: is is an L 0 -norm a ack. We set parameter gamma bounding the fraction of perturbed features to 1.0.
We use each of these a acks to generate adversarial images in the following way. For each dataset, we split the test set, that is, the 10,000 images, into its halves. From each set of 5,000 original images, we remove any misclassi ed images and label the rest as normal. Next, we use each of the above a acks to generate 5,000 adversarial images for each set of normal images. We discard any generated images that are correctly classi ed and label the rest as adversarial. We then use one set of normal images together with its corresponding adversarial images to train a random-forest classi er based on the activation values of the monitored neurons. e remaining normal and adversarial images are used to test the ability of the classi er to detect adversarial images.
Existing detection techniques. In our experiments, we compare our approach with three state-of-the-art adversarial-image detection techniques from the literature [29, 60] , two of which are classi er based and one is not.
Kim et al. [29] present two techniques based on the surprise measure of a given input to a neural network. ey show that this surprise measure can be used to detect adversarial inputs, under the assumption that such inputs are more surprising than normal ones. e rst technique presented in their paper, namely Likelihood-based Surprise Adequacy (LSA), is an extension of previous work [19] . In LSA, they estimate the probability density function of each neuron's activation values, which is then used to measure how surprising an incoming input is. e second technique, namely Distance-based Surprise Adequacy (DSA), is a novel method based on the activation values of a set of neurons (i.e., a layer of neurons). In DSA, the surprise of an input x is measured by the distances between the activation-value vectors of the selected neurons from the closest input in the same class and between and the closest input z in a di erent class. Both LSA and DSA train a classi er based on surprise values to distinguish adversarial and normal examples. e third technique, mMutant [60] , is based on the observation that, compared to a normal example, it is easier to change the class of an adversarial example via small mutations to the neural network. ey rst de ne the label change rate (LCR) of an input on slightly mutated versions of the original neural network. e LCR is found by dividing the number of predictions on mutated models deviating from the original prediction over the number of mutated models. e fundamental assumption behind mMutant is that the LCR of adversarial inputs is higher than the LCR of normal ones. We investigated the validity of this assumption, and our experiments suggest that it does not necessarily hold in general.
eir paper provides a detection algorithm based on this assumption that tries to identify an LCR threshold for distinguishing between normal and adversarial inputs. However, this algorithm yields worse results [60] when compared to the AUC score achieved by the LCRs directly. For this reason, we do not consider it here.
For selecting hyper-parameters for the above techniques, we pick the con guration that achieves the best results. For LSA and DSA, we pick the best layers as proposed in the original paper since we use the same neural networks in our evaluation. For the a acks that are not included in the original paper, we still try to pick the layer that is the most e ective. Note that, by re-optimizing hyperparameters for each experiment, we give these two techniques a signi cant advantage over others (incl. RAID). e authors of mMutant describe four mutation operators for neural networks. We limit our comparison to Neuron Activation Inverse (NAI), which the authors show to be most e ective.
Machine speci cations. We conducted all our experiments on a 32-core Intel ® Xeon ® Gold 6134M CPU @ 3.20GH machine with 768GB of memory, running Debian v10.
Metrics
We evaluate the e ectiveness of our approach using the following metrics.
Detection accuracy. e accuracy of a detection technique is a standard metric. For a set containing both normal and adversarial images, accuracy is the percentage of all images that are correctly detected as normal or adversarial. Higher accuracy suggests a be er detection technique.
True-positive rate. We refer to the adversarial images that are correctly identi ed by our technique as true positives (TP), and to those that are incorrectly identi ed as false negatives (FN). e true-positive rate (TPR) is de ned as TP TP+FN and denotes the ratio of correctly detected adversarial images over all adversarial images. A higher true-positive rate is be er.
False-positive rate. We refer to the normal images that are correctly identi ed by our technique as true negatives (TN), and to those that are incorrectly identi ed as false positives (FP). e false-positive rate (FPR) is de ned as FP FP+TN and denotes the ratio of normal images that are detected as adversarial over all normal images. A lower false-positive rate is be er.
Area under curve of receiver operator characteristic. e receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve plots the TPR against the FPR for all classi cation thresholds, which de ne the classi cation boundary between classes. Assuming that a detection classi er is expected to rank adversarial images higher than normal ones, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) denotes the probability that a randomly chosen adversarial image is ranked higher than a randomly chosen normal image. An AUC score that is closer to 1 is be er.
Results
We now present our experimental results for each of the above research questions.
Unless stated otherwise, we con gured our implementation to use exactly one classi er (not a pool), which is a random forest with 32 decision trees (or estimators). A er ltering out 50% of the neurons in the networks for MNIST and CIFAR-10, the random forest is trained with the activation values of 64 randomly selected neurons.
We repeated all of our experiments 8 times, each time using a di erent random seed for the classi er and a di erent randomly selected set of neurons. Unless we explicitly state otherwise, the rest of this section reports mean results and their standard deviation.
RQ1: Adversarial-image detection. To measure the e ectiveness of our approach in detecting adversarial images, we evaluate it against several well-known a acks. Tabs. 1 and 2 show the results for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively. e rst column of the tables indicates the used a ack. For instance, to obtain the results of the PGD row, we trained and tested our classi er using two di erent sets, each containing ∼5,000 normal images as well as ∼5,000 adversarial ones, which were generated by the PGD a ack. Note that the number of images is approximate due to ltering, which is described in detail in Sect. 4.2. For L 2 , we trained and tested using ∼5,000 normal images, ∼5,000 adversarial images generated by DF, and ∼5,000 adversarial images generated by CW. For L ∞ , we used PGD, FGSM, and BIM to generate adversarial images, and for L * , all six a acks. Note that an L 0 row corresponds to the JSMA one as JSMA is the only L 0 a ack used in our experiments. e remaining columns of the tables show the detection accuracy, the true-and false-positive rates, the area under the ROC curve, the number of true and false positives as well as the number of true and false negatives.
As shown in Tabs. 1 and 2, RAID is most e ective in detecting L ∞ a acks, with accuracy, TPR, and AUC at 1.00 and FPR at 0.00, which constitute the theoretical best. RAID is least e ective for L 2 a acks; this is to be expected since these are more powerful [11] . Naturally, the e ectiveness for L * lies in-between.
Tab. 3 shows the AUC score achieved by RAID when trained with normal and adversarial images generated by all a acks (L * ) and tested on normal and adversarial images generated by the a acks shown in the columns of the table. For example, when training RAID with all a acks, it achieves an AUC score of 1.0 when tested only on FGSM a acks. Again, our approach is most e ective in detecting L ∞ a acks and slightly less e ective for others.
Since RAID detects an adversarial image based on the prediction of a classi er, its running time for a single input is in the order of milliseconds. Training the classi er(s) used by (P-)RAID takes (3) internal complexity of the classier(s) (e.g., number of estimators in a random forest). For RAID's best con guration described at the beginning of this subsection, training a random forest with 10,000 images takes less than 30 seconds.
RQ2: A ack norms. We refer to L 0 , L 2 , L ∞ , and L * as a ack norms.
is research question focuses on evaluating whether RAID's detection generalizes within and across a ack norms.
Within an a ack norm, we train with (normal and) adversarial images generated by an a ack of a particular norm (e.g., PGD for L ∞ , DF for L 2 ) and measure the AUC score achieved by RAID when testing with (normal and) adversarial images generated by a di erent a ack of the same norm (e.g., FGSM for L ∞ , CW for L 2 ). e results for L ∞ are shown in Tab. 4, and for L 2 in Tab. 5. e rst column of the tables refers to the a ack with which we train, whereas the rst row indicates the used dataset as well as the a ack with which we test. RAID achieves the best possible AUC score with 0.00 standard deviation for all a acks within L ∞ . erefore, our detection technique generalizes perfectly within this norm. As shown in Tab. 5 however, RAID does not generalize as well within the L 2 norm. e AUC scores in this table are slightly lower than those in Tabs. 1 and 2, where we trained with L 2 , DF, or CW and tested with the same. is also holds when comparing with the scores in Tab. 3, where we trained with all a acks and tested with L 2 , DF, or CW. ese results indicate that, for the more powerful L 2 norm, our detection technique is more e ective when trained with the a ack it is expected to detect.
Across a ack norms, we train with (normal and) adversarial images generated by all a acks of a particular norm (e.g., PGD, FGSM, and BIM of L ∞ ) and measure the AUC score achieved by RAID when testing with (normal and) adversarial images generated by all a acks of a di erent norm (e.g., DF and CW of L 2 ). e results are shown in Tab. 6. e rst column of the table refers to the norm with which we train, whereas the rst row indicates the used dataset as well as the norm with which we test.
As previously observed (Tab. 3), when training with L * , our technique is most e ective in detecting L ∞ a acks and only slightly less e ective for other norms. When training with L 2 , RAID's detection generalizes quite well to all other a ack norms (L * , L ∞ , and L 0 ). e same holds when training with L 0 , although this con guration is less e ective for the CIFAR-10 dataset. ese results suggest that training with stronger a acks generalizes to detecting weaker ones. On the other hand, when training with the weaker L ∞ a acks, the AUC scores for the detection of L 2 and L 0 a acks drop signi cantly.
RQ3: Comparison with state of the art. We now compare RAID with the three state-of-the-art detection techniques discussed in Sect. 4.2, namely DSA, LSA, and mMutant.
For this experiment, we measure the AUC score achieved by each technique when tested with each a ack and a ack norm. e results are shown in Fig. 3 for MNIST and Fig. 4 for CIFAR-10. For the techniques that require training, that is, for RAID, DSA, and LSA, we train with L * . We chose this con guration because it is the most general, and thus, the most natural. In practice, a detection technique is not a-priori aware of the type or norm of future a acks; it is, therefore, safer to anticipate all of them.
To obtain the AUC scores in the gures, we test each technique using normal and adversarial images, which are generated by the a acks shown on the x-axes of the bar charts. In addition to the aforementioned a acks, we add two more for this experiment. First, we simulate an adaptive adversary against mMutant by introducing CW-0.95, which is exactly the same as CW except that the condence parameter is set to 0.95. In other words, CW-0.95 generates adversarial images classi ed with a prediction con dence of at least 0.95 at the expense of adding more distortion. Note that we only add this a ack for CIFAR-10 since CW cannot generate adversarial inputs with high con dence on MNIST. Second, we introduce CW-Noise denoting that our test set contains, in addition to the ∼5,000 normal images, ∼5,000 adversarial images generated by CW as well as ∼5,000 normal images with Gaussian noise (mean=0, std=0.2) by following the guidelines presented in [9] . We apply the ltering described in Sect. 4.2 on the test sets of all techniques.
As shown in Fig. 3 , the e ectiveness of RAID, DSA, and LSA is comparable on the MNIST dataset. In the best case, RAID outperforms DSA by 0.05 for CW, and LSA by 0.03 for CW-0.95. In the worst case, LSA outperforms RAID by 0.02 for CW-Noise. e e ectiveness of mMutant varies signi cantly. For example, it outperforms all other techniques for the powerful CW a acks, but is substantially worse for the simple PGD a acks.
is is because mMutant is based on the assumption that adversarial examples are sensitive to mutations, that is, they are typically classi ed with a low prediction con dence. However, iterative a acks such as BIM and PGD generate adversarial images with very high prediction con dence (e.g., 0.99 almost all the time), which makes them more insensitive, and hence, harder to detect by mMutant. In this sense, the more distortion is added to the input, the lower the chance that mMutant detects it since higher distortion typically increases prediction con dence. Fig. 4 shows the same comparison for CIFAR-10. Here, RAID consistently outperforms DSA and LSA, namely for L * , L ∞ , L 2 , FGSM, BIM, DF, CW, CW-Noise, and JSMA. eir e ectiveness is equal for PGD, and DSA outperforms RAID by 0.02 for CW-0.95. RAID outperforms mMutant for L * , L ∞ , PGD, FGSM, BIM, CW-0.95, and CW-Noise, in the best case by 0.88 for PGD and in the worst case by 0.09 for FGSM. On the other hand, mMutant looks slightly more e ective than RAID for L 2 (by 0.03), DF (by 0.01), CW (by 0.04), and JSMA (by 0.03). However, as shown with CW-0.95, increasing prediction con dence for these cases would reduce mMutant's e ectiveness.
In addition to (o en signi cantly) outperforming state-of-the-art detection techniques, RAID is also the most consistent in terms of e ectiveness across di erent types of a acks and norms. Tab. 7 shows the ranges of AUC scores achieved by RAID, DSA, LSA, and mMutant for the a acks in Figs. 3 and 4 . As shown in the table, the ranges are more stable for RAID than for any other technique.
In terms of performance, RAID is also very e cient. At runtime, RAID requires (1) feeding the incoming input to the original neural network to collect its AF and (2) feeding the AF to the detection classi er; in total, this takes less than a second as described in RQ1. LSA, DSA, and mMutant demonstrate a similarly good runtime performance. mMutant requires feeding the input to a number of mutated neural networks (default is 500). Given that each neuralnetwork query takes less than a millisecond, mMutant can make a decision under 1 second. Note that, although model mutation takes much more time (i.e., per mutation slightly more than 5 seconds for MNIST and slightly more than 15 seconds for CIFAR-10), it is performed o ine and incurs no runtime overhead. Similarly to RAID, LSA and DSA involve feeding the input to the original network and then feeding the extracted data to the classi er; overall, these steps also take around 1 second.
RQ4: Selection of monitored neurons. To determine how the selection of monitored neurons impacts the e ectiveness of our technique, we rst measure the AUC scores achieved by RAID for di erent numbers of monitored neurons, namely 1, 4, 16, 64, and 256 (or all essential neurons if their total number is smaller than 256). For this experiment, we train and test RAID on each a ack norm. e results are presented in Fig. 5 , where the plot on the le is for MNIST and the plot on the right for CIFAR-10. As shown in the gure, more neurons lead to be er AUC scores, although the di erences are insigni cant when comparing 64 and 256 neurons. is is expected because the larger the number of monitored neurons, the higher are the chances of correctly detecting more normal and adversarial examples. In particular, the activation value of a neuron may uctuate only for a speci c set of normal and adversarial images, whereas the activation value of another neuron may uctuate for a completely disjoint set. erefore, when monitoring both of these neurons, our technique is likely to be more e ective. In practice, with only a single neuron to monitor, RAID may be lucky with its selection as for L ∞ and CIFAR-10 in Fig. 5 , but this is typically not the case as is also shown in the gure.
To further investigate the impact of monitored neurons on our technique, we also performed the same experiment when selecting the best neurons, that is, those with the largest di erence of mean activation ngerprints (see Sect. 3.2), and when selecting the worst neurons. Note that the worst neurons are normally ltered out by our technique as inessential. e results are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. For this experiment, unlike for the one in Fig. 5 , we do not perform 8 runs of RAID since the sets of best and worst neurons are chosen deterministically. When comparing the AUC scores of Figs. 5 and 6, we observe that selecting the best neurons mostly bene ts con gurations with a small number of neurons. For 64 neurons, which is the con guration used throughout our experiments, RAID with the best neurons is be er only for L ∞ and MNIST and only by 0.01, which justi es the value of our ltering threshold (50%). Interestingly, some AUC scores achieved by RAID with the best neurons are slightly worse than those with random neurons. is may happen when the activation values of the best neurons uctuate for overlapping sets of images, whereas there are worse neurons that would help with the detection of other images. e AUC scores achieved by RAID when selecting the worst neurons ( Fig. 7) are signi cantly worse than those in Figs. 5 and 6, which justi es the existence of our ltering threshold. For CIFAR-10, all AUC scores are 0.5.
is is because the neural network for the CIFAR-10 dataset has a much larger number of neurons in comparison to the network for MNIST (see Sect. 4.2). Consequently, there are also many more inessential neurons. RQ5: Multiple classi ers. As explained in Sect. 3.3, P-RAID is the robust version of RAID against adaptive adversaries. In this research question, we investigate the e ectiveness of a pool of classi ers versus a single classi er. In particular, we compare the AUC scores achieved by RAID and P-RAID, with a pool size of 32 random forests (each with 32 estimators). We trained both tools with the expected a acks (e.g., trained with FGSM and tested with FGSM). e results are presented in Tab. 8.
As shown in the table, the e ectiveness of the tools is almost identical. We mark the three di erences in bold; the achieved AUC scores di er by 0.01 across the two implementations. Consequently, using the P-RAID version of our approach has no negative impact on its success in detecting adversarial images. On the contrary, it o ers the theoretical bene t of being more powerful against adaptive adversaries.
On the other hand, state-of-the-art tools mentioned in RQ3 do not claim robustness against adaptive adversaries. e original idea behind LSA is already shown to be bypassed [11] . For DSA, there is no speci c mechanism against adaptive adversaries, and such classi er-based detectors are typically found to be weak against adaptive adversaries [11] . In our experiments, we show the weakness of mMutant by introducing CW-0.95. RQ6: Di erent classi er types. We now study the impact of di erent classi er types and their parameters on the e ectiveness of our approach. In particular, we use the following classi er types:
DT: Decision tree [49] RF: Random forest with 32, 64, and 128 estimators [7] AB: AdaBoost with 32, 64, and 128 estimators [51] KNN: k-nearest neighbors with 3 and 5 neighbors [5, 43] We selected these classi ers because they are simple when compared to huge detection networks [38] , on the other hand, they 
MNIST
CIFAR-10 RAID P-RAID RAID P-RAID L * 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.01 L ∞ 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 L 2 0.98 ± 0.00 0.98 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.00 0.90 ± 0.02 PGD 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 FGSM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 BIM 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00 DF 0.99 ± 0.00 0.98 ± 0.00 0.91 ± 0.00 0.91 ± 0.02 CW 0.98 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.02 JSMA 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 0.96 ± 0.01 are known to be e ective in many tasks. Note that RF and AB are referred to as ensemble methods because they consist of multiple classi ers, in this case decision trees. For this experiment, we train one classi er of each type (not a pool) with the expected a ack norms. We then measure the AUC scores achieved by RAID when using each of these classi ers. e results are presented in Figs. 8 and 9 for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. As shown in the bar charts, the ensemble methods RF and AB are more e ective than DT and KNN on the two datasets. KNN is slightly be er than AB for MNIST, but noticeably worse for CIFAR-10. ese results suggest that ensembles of simple classi ers, such as decision trees, are su cient for our approach to be very e ective in practice.
Out of the two ensemble methods, RF is more e ective than AB. e number of RF estimators does not have a signi cant impact on the AUC scores. Speci cally, when using 64 estimators, the AUC scores can increase by up to 0.01 in comparison to 32 estimators (for L 2 a acks in both datasets, and for L 0 in CIFAR-10). ere is also no di erence between using 64 and 128 estimators. Recall, however, that the number of estimators a ects the training time, and therefore, RF32 can be trained more e ciently.
reats to Validity
We identify the following threats to the validity of our experiments.
External validity. External validity ensures that the results of an experimental evaluation generalize [54] . Our results may not generalize to other datasets or network models [54] . However, we use two of the most popular datasets for evaluating state-of-the-art adversarial-image detection techniques (e.g., [29, 60] ) and borrow the models from one of these techniques [29] . e results may also not generalize to other a acks although we generate adversarial images using six well-known a acks across three a ack norms.
In our evaluation, we compare RAID with three adversarialimage detection techniques, but our results may not generalize to others [54] . To alleviate this threat, we selected the most recent detection techniques published at top venues. Moreover, our implementation is open source so that others can reproduce our results and perform more extensive comparisons. Figure 9 : AUC scores achieved by RAID on the CIFAR-10 dataset when using di erent classi er types.
Internal validity. e internal validity [54] of randomized approaches may be compromised by a potentially biased selection of random seeds. We avoid this pitfall by performing all of our experiments 8 times, each time using a di erent random seed for the classi er and a di erent randomly selected set of neurons. We report mean results and their standard deviation.
RELATED WORK
Adversarial robustness. e area of adversarial machine learning has been very active since the discovery of adversarial examples for neural networks [58] . On one side, more e ective adversarial a acks are being developed. On the other side, researchers develop new techniques to obtain robust neural networks. Here, we consider two types of robustness techniques: (1) those that detect adversarial examples, and (2) those that aim to build a network for which it is di cult to generate adversarial examples, namely defenses. According to this classi cation, RAID falls into the rst category.
Adversarial-input detection. Despite these e orts to ensure robustness of neural networks, new a acks o en evade existing defense or detection techniques. On the detection side, Grosse et al., Gong et al., and Metzen et al. [22, 24, 38] train a secondary classi er for detecting adversarial examples; in this aspect, these techniques are similar to ours. From these three, the approach presented by Metzen et al. [38] is the closest to our work. However, unlike their technique, we propose a much simpler methodology and an extension (i.e., in P-RAID) to handle adaptive adversaries. Hendrycks and Gimpel, Bhagoji et al., and Li and Li [6, 26, 32] propose methods based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Feinman et al. [19] introduce two techniques, called kernel-density estimation and Bayesian neural-network uncertainty. Carlini and Wagner [11] , however, nd all of the aforementioned techniques ine ective for providing a thorough detection mechanism.
While there are other works that claim to be e ective in detecting adversarial inputs, they have already been surpassed or bypassed by later work. For example, work on statistical detection [50] can be bypassed [27] . Similarly, feature squeezing [62] can be defeated [53] , and both methods by Zantedeschi et al. [63] and MagNet [37] are shown not to be robust [12, 33] .
Even more recent detection techniques include work that specializes on adaptive adversaries [28] , focuses on black-box a acks [14] , and makes use of the SHAP explainability technique [20] . Lastly, two detection techniques [29, 60] have recently been proposed by the so ware-engineering community. We provide a detailed description of these in the previous section, where we compare them with RAID.
Defenses against adversarial inputs. On the defense side, adversarial retraining was found to be e ective [36] . Despite this, many defenses [40, 46] are circumvented by other work [4, 10, 25] . Generally, one should follow recent guidelines for properly evaluating the robustness of a neural network [9] .
Neural-network testing. e increasing popularity of deeplearning systems and their vulnerability to adversarial examples also motivated research into testing techniques for neural networks. Existing research in the area adapts testing methodologies from traditional so ware engineering. DeepXplore [48] is the rst to introduce a specialized coverage criterion (i.e., neuron coverage) for neural networks. Subsequently, new such coverage criteria have been proposed. For example, DeepGauge [34] re nes neuron coverage, DeepCover [55] adapts MC/DC from traditional so ware testing, and DeepCT [35] investigates combinatorial testing. However, more recent work argues that there is limited correlation between coverage and robustness of neural networks [16] .
Eniser et al. [17] make use of fault-localization metrics for nding neurons that can be exploited to fool networks. Sun et al. [56] adapt concolic testing [8, 21, 52] for generating test inputs to neural networks. Other approaches make use of coverage-guided fuzzing for input generation [15, 42, 61] . DeepTest [59] and DeepRoad [64] focus on generating test inputs for deep-learning-based autonomous driving systems. Unlike the above testing techniques, RAID proposes an online detection technique for adversarial examples.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a novel mechanism, namely RAID, for detecting adversarial examples in neural networks. In addition to this, we introduce P-RAID, which is designed to be robust even against adaptive adversaries. We extensively evaluate our technique and show its e ectiveness, for instance by achieving a 90% AUC score against the strongest a acks (i.e., CW, DF) and perfect detection against weaker adversaries (i.e., PGD, BIM, FGSM). e comparison with three state-of-the-art detection techniques shows that RAID is both more stable and more e ective. In the future, we plan to test our tool on other threat models, larger neural networks, and di erent tasks, such as natural language processing.
